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THE 1971 I.C.J. ADVISORY OPINION ON
SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA)
Preston Brown*
I. INTRODUCTION

South Africa has administered the adjoining territory of South West
Africa (Namibia) for over fifty years.1 Initially, that administration
was granted to South Africa when it was designated a mandatory by

the League of Nations. Since the dissolution of the League 25 years
ago, South Africa's administration of the territory and, more recently,
its right to administer, have been the subject of continued and
escalating controversy.
The most recent development in this confused situation is the
advisory opinion that was rendered in June, 1971, by the International Court of Justice. 2 That opinion was requested by the Security
Council of the United Nations3 and dealt with the question of South
Africa's right to continue to administer Namibia. It also confronted
the consequences of the Court's conclusion that the right no longer
exists. While it is not clear what the practical effect of the opinion will
be because of South Africa's refusal to accept it,4 the opinion does
raise important questions not only with respect to the Namibian
situation, but also regarding the Court's role in the development of
international law.
The latter consideration is currently receiving a great deal of
attention.' Of particular concern has been the widespread failure of
member states to use the Court to resolve their disputes. This disuse is
evidenced by the fact that the I.C.J.'s predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, decided considerably more cases than
the present Court despite the fact that it had a shorter lifetime.
* Resident Counsel of firm of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, Washington, D.C. Member, New York and District of Columbia Bars. B.A., 1958, LL.B.,
1961, Harvard University.

1. The former German Territory of South West Africa is now referred to as
Namibia. This symbolically reflects the widening emphasis on the territory's
potential "nationhood" status.
2. [1971] I.C.J. 16.
3. The Security Council's request was made pursuant to U.N. CHARTER art.
96, para. 1.
4. Advisory opinions are not binding on member states of the United Nations.
5. See, e.g., Gross, The International Court of Justice: Consideration of
Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the InternationalLegal Order, 65 AM. J.
INT'L

L. 253 (1971).
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Moreover, at the time that the I.C.J. was considering the Security
Council's advisory request on Namibia, that was the only proceeding
pending before it.
Widespread concern over the status of the Court culminated in the
adoption of General Assembly resolution 2723 on December 15,
1970. That resolution authorized the preparation and distribution of a
questionnaire inviting all member states to submit their views and
suggestions on methods of enhancing the efficacy of the I.C.J. The
judges of the Court were naturally aware of this inquiry well before
the Namibian question was put to them again. In fact, it seems
reasonable to believe that they were anxious to have the opportunity
of readjudicating that question in the context of concern over the
Court's future. Thus, a consideration of the opinion's impact on the
future role of the Court is germane to an analysis of the opinion itself.
Before undertaking such an analysis, however, the legal and historical
background of the Namibian situation prior to the Court's decision is
presented in order to put the discussion in a proper context.

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Mandate and the Mandate System
By virtue of the Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of World War
I, Germany renounced all rights and titles to her overseas possessions,
including South West Africa. While it was agreed at the time that these
possessions should not be annexed by the victorious powers, it was
also accepted that many were inhabited by peoples not "yet able to
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world .... "6 Accordingly, article 22, paragraph 1, of the Covenant of
the League of Nations articulated at the outset "the principle that the
well-being and development of such peoples form[ed] a sacred trust
of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust
should be embodied in [the] Covenant." Article 22, paragraph 2,
added that the best method of giving practical effect to that principle
was to entrust the tutelage of such peoples to advanced nations acting
"as Mandatories on behalf of the League." The article went on to
classify the mandates according to the stage of development,
geographical situation and economic condition of each particular
territory. 7 In this regard, the Covenant specified that South West
Africa and certain other territories, given their low level of develop-

ment, could be "best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as
6.
7.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art.

22, para. 1.
22,

para.

3.
Winter, 1971
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integral portions of its territory," subject to certain safeguards "in the
interests of the indigenous population." 8 Article 22 then concluded
by requiring each mandatory to submit annual reports on the territory
committed to its charge, 9 and by establishing a permanent commission to review the annual reports.'0 Finally, article 22 charged the
Council of the League to define the degree of authority, control and
administration to be exercised by the mandatory in the absence of
express agreement."
On December 17, 1920, the Council of the League confirmed the
mandate agreement with Great Britain for the administration of South
West Africa by the Union of South Africa. The mandate, together

with the Covenant, set forth the principles and defined the terms
under which South West Africa was to be administered. Specifically,
the mandate provided that:
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and legislation over
the territory subject to the present Mandate as an integral portion of the
Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of the Union of South
Africa to the territory, subject to such local modification as circumstances
may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and the social12 progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject
to the present Mandate.
Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the mandate set forth specific obligations of
the mandatory.' 3 Article 6 required South Africa to make an annual
report "to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information
with regard to the territory and indicating the measures taken to carry
out the obligations assumed under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5." The
concluding article stated in part that the "consent of the Council of
the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of
the present Mandate."' 4
8.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT

art. 22, para. 6.

9. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 7.
10.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 9.
11. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 8.
12. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT annex B (Mandate for German

South West Africa), art. 2 [hereinafter cited as Mandate].
13. Prohibition of slave trade, sale of intoxicating beverages to natives, and
control of arms traffic is provided by article 3 of the mandate. Article 4 prohibits
military training or the installation of military bases within the territory of the
mandate. Article 5 guarantees freedom of worship, freedom of conscience and
free access by missionaries.
14. Mandate, art. 7. On January 31, 1923, the Council of the League adopted
rules requiring mandatory governments to transmit petitions to the League from

communities or sections of populations of mandated territories.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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B. Dissolutionof the League: Advisory Proceedings in the Court
The League of Nations was formally dissolved by its Assembly
pursuant to the dissolution resolution of April 18, 1946.5 The
relevant portions of that resolution dealing with the question of
mandates stated that the League:
3. Recognizes that, on the termination of the League's existence, its
functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end, but
notes that Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations
embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League:
4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League
now administering territories under Mandate to continue to administer them
for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance
with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates until other
arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the
16
respective mandatory Powers.
As the resolution indicated, the United Nations had already set up its
trusteeship system-in part to deal with the territories still held under
mandate. Article 77 of the Charter of the United Nations provided
that the trusteeship system "shall apply to such territories in the
following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of
trusteeship agreements: (a) territories now held under mandate.... .,,7 Despite the import of these provisions, South Africa
took the position that the mandate had lapsed with the dissolution of
the League and that all duties pursuant to the mandate had
terminated. At the first session of the General Assembly, South Africa
submitted a proposal that it should annex South West Africa. I" The
proposal was rejected. 9 South Africa subsequently refused to
execute a truesteeship agreement and discontinued sending any
reports to the United Nations.2 °
Efforts to resolve the matter through negotiation and debate proved
fruitless in the face of South Africa's intransigence. Consequently, in
1949, the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the
I.C.J. on the various aspects of the legal status of South West Africa.

15. The Assembly of the League by resolution of April 12, 1946, attributed to
itself the responsibilities of the Council.
16. League Resolution of April 18, 1946.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 77, para. 1.
18. 1 U.N. GAOR Annex 13A, at 235, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/41 (1946).
19. G.A. Res. 65, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 123 (1946).
20. South Africa was the only mandatory that refused to execute a trusteeship
agreement.
Winter, 1971
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This opinion, which was rendered in 1950,21 articulated the basic legal
principles that still control the situation in the opinion of all member
states except South Africa and its partisans, who have repeatedly
refused to be bound by the decision.
In its 1950 opinion, the Court rejected South Africa's contention
that the mandate lapsed with the dissolution of the League of Nations.
The Court noted that the mandatory was created "in the interest of
the inhabitants of the territory, and of humanity in general, as an
international institution with an international object-a sacred trust of
civilization." 22 The Court reasoned that international supervision of
the mandatory constituted a necessary security for the effective
performance of the mandate. Therefore, the United Nations as an
international organ performing similar, if not identical, functions to
the League was entitled to exercise such supervision on behalf of the
international community.2 3 The Court also advised, however, that the
Charter did not obligate South Africa to place South West Africa
under the trusteeship system.2 4 Moreover, it concluded that the
competence to determine and modify the international status of
South West Africa rested with South Africa, acting with the consent
25
of the United Nations.
South Africa ignored the advisory opinion. The primary concern of
the member states, of course, was South Africa's increasingly rigorous
application of its policies of apartheidin South West Africa. By 1957,
the General Assembly's Special Committee on South West Africa was
instructed to undertake a study of the legal actions available to that
body and to concerned states. 2 6 The Committee concluded that at
least those former members of the League who were then members of

21. [1950] I.C.J. 128.
22. [1950] I.C.J. 128, 132.
23. [1950] I.C.J. 128, 137.
24. [1950] I.C.J. 128,140.
25. [1950] I.C.J. 128, 143. In 1955 and 1956 the I.C.J. issued two further
advisory opinions supplementing the 1950 opinion. [1955] I.C.J. 67; [1956]
I.C.J. 23. The first opinion upheld the voting procedure adopted by the General
Assembly on mandate questions. The League had required unanimity, but the
Court held that the General Assembly need only require a two-thirds majority.
The League's unanimity requirement may or may not have applied to mandate
questions. For a discussion of this question see text pp. 231-32 infra. South
Africa's argument that this constituted a substantive change was rejected. The
1956 opinion confirmed the right of the General Assembly to hear oral
presentations from the territorial petitioners.
26. See generally Gross, The South West Africa Case: What Happened?, 45
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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the United Nations could invoke article 7 of the mandate," thereby
permitting them to submit a dispute relating to the mandate to the
I.C.J. Any favorable judgment obtained in such a proceeding, unlike
an advisory opinion, would be binding on the parties.2 8
C. Litigation and the U.N. Reaction

Ethiopia and Liberia commenced proceedings against South Africa
before the I.C.J. in November, 1960. Essentially, there were three
questions presented: Was the mandate still in force? Did the United
Nations have supervisory authority? Was South Africa violating its
obligations by imposing apartheid upon the non-white inhabitants of
the territory?
South Africa challenged, first, the standing of those states to sue
and, second, the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues raised.
This latter assertion was based in part on the theory that the mandate
was not a treaty under article 37 of the Statute of the I.C.J."1 In late
December, 1962, the Court rejected South Africa's position and
found, by a vote of eight to seven, that it had "jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute." 3 Its decision encompassed a finding that the mandate was an "international agreement
having the character of a treaty or convention" 3 1 in satisfaction of
article 37 of the I.C.J. Statute.
On July 18, 1966, after the parties had expended inordinate
amounts of time and money developing their arguments on the merits,
the Court rejected the claims of Ethiopia and Liberia.3 2 It did so, to
the surprise of both parties,33 by concluding that neither Ethiopia nor
27. "The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between
the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the
interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute, if
it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of
International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant bf the League of
Nations." Mandate, art. 7.
28. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 59.
29. "Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a
matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties
to the present Statute, be referred to the International Court of Justice." I.C.J.
STATUTE art. 37.
30. [1962] I.C.J. 319, 347.
31. [19621 I.C.J. 319, 347.
32. [1966] I.C.J. 6.
33. South Africa had not argued on these grounds, apparently assuming the
matter settled.
Winter, 1971
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Liberia had sufficient legal interest in the subject matter of their
claims to entitle them to a judgment. The Court reasoned that
although they had standing to "activate" the Court, they could not
obtain a decision on the merits.3 4 Thus, the Court's opinion was
delivered "without pronouncing upon, and wholly without prejudice
to, the question of whether the Mandate is still in force. "
The
result, as Judge Jessup of the United States remarked in his dissent,
was a "procedure of utter futility." 36 Although South Africa
considered it a vindication of its position,37 the general reaction to the
Court's 1966 decision was one of dismay.

D. Termination of the Mandate
At the fall, 1966, session of the General Assembly, after much
debate and criticism of the I.C.J., resolution 2145 was passed. That
resolution terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia and
shifted the direct responsibility for that territory's administration to
the U.N. An examination of the progress of the debates preceeding its
passage provides a revealing glimpse into the General Assembly's
law-making procedures, as well as setting the foundation for a
consideration of the legal validity of the resolution itself. The first
stages of the debate focused on the question of whether the General
Assembly could simply declare a unilateral termination of the
mandate by virtue of its own authority. The initial draft of resolution
2145 proposed that the General Assembly, recognizing South Africa's
failure to fulfill its obligations, should declare the mandate terminated
and should itself assume administration. It provided that the General
Assembly:
3. Declares that South Africa has failed to fulfill its obligations in respect
of the administration of the mandated Territory and to ensure the moral
34. [1966] I.C.J. 6, 39.
35. [1966] I.C.J. 6, 19.
36. [1966] I.C.J. 6, 382. See generally Blemming, South West Africa Cases
Ethopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa Second Phase, 5 CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 241 (1967); Friedmann, JurisprudentialImplications of the Southwest Africa
Cases, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1967); Landis, Southwest Africa
Cases: Remand to the U.N., 52 CORNELL L.Q. 627 (1967); Murphy, Southwest
Africa Judgment: A Study in Justiciability, 5 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 477
(1967).
37. See generally Green, South West Africa and the World Court, 22 INT'L J.
39 (1966); Gross, supra note 24; Manning, The South West Africa Cases, A
Personal Analysis, 3 INT'L RELATIONS 98 (1966); Verzijl, The South West
Africa Cases (Second Phase), 3 INT'L RELATIONS 87 (1966).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South
West Africa;
4. Decides to take over the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty
to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South
Africa and to assume direct responsibility for the administration of the
Mandated Territory .... 38
As the debates progressed, however, the emphasis shifted. The draft
resolution was amended to state that the General Assembly:
3. Declares that South Africa has failed to fulfill its obligations in respect
of the administration of the mandated Territory and to ensure the moral
and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South
West Africa, and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate;

4. Decides that the Mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be
exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa is
therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to administer the

Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct
responsibility of the United Nations .... 39
The resolution as passed thus reflected not a unilateral termination,
but the recognition that because South Africa had "disavowed" the
mandate, the United Nations was justified in considering it terminated. Implicit in this position was the legal argument that the U.N.
was not terminating on the basis of some inherent power that it
possessed as the institutional representative of the international
community. Instead, it was merely declaring its termination in
accordance with international treaty law.
This shift in emphasis made resolution 2145 more acceptable to
many delegates. To begin with, those in favor cited the I.C.J.'s 1962
opinion, wherein the Court found that the mandate was a treaty or
convention within the meaning of article 37 of the I.C.J. Statute.4"
From this, the advocates of this argument reasoned that the U.N., as
successor to the League of Nations, was a party to that treaty. As a
party to an international treaty confronted with violations and
rejections by the other party, the U.N., through the General
Assembly, had full authority to terminate the treaty and thereby end
South Africa's right as the lawful mandatory.4 '
38. 21 U.N. GAOR 2 (1966).
39. 21 U.N. GAOR 22 (1966) (emphasis added).
40. [1962] I.C.J. 319, 386. Judge Jessup's concurring opinion in that decision
expands and re-enforces that finding by examining the validity of other
arrangements which can be taken to constitute treaties or conventions under
international law.
41. See, e.g., Statement of-the United Kingdom Representative, 21 U.N.
GAOR 5 (1966); Statement of the Israeli Representative, 21 U.N. GAOR 10-11
(1966).
Winter, 1971
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In asserting South Africa's breach as grounds for termination, the
proponents of the argument relied upon fundamental principles of
international law that are set forth in article 57 of the Revised Draft
Articles on the Law of Treaties, adopted by the International Law
Commission in 1966. Article 57 provides in part that:
3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of the present article,
consists in:
(a) A repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present articles;
or
(b) The violation of a provision essential to the accomplishments of
the object or purpose of the treaty.42
Some of the delegates emphasized South Africa's failure to submit
reports and accept supervision, and its continued imposition of
apartheid. Others stressed South Africa's outspoken statements
rejecting the mandate.4 3 Although there were varying characterizations of disavowal and material breach in the Assembly's record, it was
clear that the concept of "disavowal" contained in amended resolution 2145 was included within both article 57 definitions of a
"material breach."
Having thus shown the existence of a breach, proponents of the
revised argument then turned to another section of article 57 that
provides:
I. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or
suspending its operation in whole or in part .... 44
Accordingly, the termination of the mandate as declared by the
amended resolution also was authorized under the Revised Draft
Articles of the Law of Treaties. Persuaded by this argument and its
concomitant shift of emphasis, the General Assembly passed the
resolution, as amended, in late October, 1966.
E. Security Council Resolutions
South Africa refused to recognize the validity of the General
Assembly's action despite continued pressure from various members
42. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966).
43. The South African spokesman made his country's position bluntly clear to
the General Assembly: ". . . as is well known, South Africa has for a long time
contended that the Mandate is no longer legally in force, and that South Africa's
right to administer the territory is not derived from the Mandate but from

military conquest, together with South Africa's openly declared and consistent
practice of continuing to administer the territory as a sacred trust toward the
inhabitants." 21 U.N. GAOR 24 (1966) (emphasis added).
44. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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and organs of the international community. In response, the Security
Council adopted resolution 264, which recognized that "the United
Nations General Assembly terminated the Mandate of South Africa
over Namibia" and called on South Africa "to immediately withdraw
its administration from the territory." South Africa, however, ignored
this request. The Security Council, "mindful of its responsibility"
under article 254s and article 646 of the United Nations Charter,
declared that South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia
constituted "an aggressive encroachment on the authority of the
United Nations, a violation of [Namibia's] territorial integrity and a
denial of political sovereignty to Namibia's people." 4 7 Accordingly, it
called on South Africa to leave Namibia by October 5, 1969.
South Africa did not leave, and on January 30, 1970, the Security
Council passed resolution 276, which figured so prominently in the
advisory proceedings discussed herein. After reaffirming General
Assembly resolution 2145 and its earlier resolutions recognizing the
termination of the mandate, Security Council resolution 276 stated

that the Council:
2. Declares that the continued presence of the South African authorities in
Namibia is illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the Government of
South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of
the mandate are illegal and invalid;
5. Calls upon all States, particularly those which have economic and other
interests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with the Government of
South Africa which are inconsistent with operative paragraph 2 of this
resolution .... 48
South Africa's response was predictable. Therefore, on July 29,
1970, the Security Council passed two further resolutions dealing with
the Namibian problem. The first, resolution 283, requested in
somewhat stronger terms that all member states take action, including
refraining from "any relations-diplomatic, consular or otherwise
with South Africa implying recognition of the authority of the South
45. "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." U.N.
CHARTER

art. 25.

46. "A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the
Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization
by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."
U.N. CHARTER art. 6.
47. Security Council Resolution 269, 24 U.N. SCOR, 1497th meeting 1
(1969).
48. Security Council Resolution 276, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1529th meeting 2
(1970).
Winter, 1971
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African Government over the territory of Namibia." 4 9 It also called
upon member states to take positive action in a number of areas, the
collective effect of which would pressure South Africa to withdraw
from Namibia. The second, resolution 284, requested the Court to
render an advisory opinion on the following question: "what are the
legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South
Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970)?"

III. THE ADVISORY OPINION OF 1971

The Court's advisory opinion was handed down on June 21, 1971.
In three operative clauses, the Court held:
(1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal,
South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from
Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the
Territory;
(2) that states members of the United Nations are under obligation to
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the
invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from
any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa
implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to,
such presence and administration;
(3) that it is incumbent upon states which are not members of the United
Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in
the action
which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to
50
Namibia.

In the course of reaching these conclusions, the Court considered a
number of issues. Four have been selected for a limited discussion on
the basis of their importance not only to Namibia, but also with
respect to the Court's role in the development of international law.

The one procedural issue to be discussed dealt with South Africa's
request for a judge ad hoc. The Court's decision to deny that request
was based on a formal, legalistic analysis. However, in its handling of
the three substantive issues-the transfer of supervision to the United
Nations; the termination of the mandate; and the effect of resolution
276-the Court's analysis was more concerned with fundamental
objectives than with technical niceties. This equitable approach
enabled the Court to reach its conclusions despite a powerful legal
49. Security Council Resolution 283, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1550th meeting 1
(1970).
50. [1966] I.C.J. 6, 58.
Vol. 5-No. 1
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argument set forth in a dissent by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. The Court's
non-technical approach may reflect, at least in part, an underlying
attempt to re-establish the Court as a viable and sympathetic
institution for the development of modem international law, particularly in the eyes of the third world. Whatever the motivation,
however, the Court's approach, in contrast to that of the dissents and
some concurring opinions, is worth examining as a development in
I.C.J. jurisprudence.
A.

The Rejection of South Africa's Request for
the Appointment of a Judge Ad Hoc

The articles of the I.C.J. Statute provide a clearly defined procedure
whereby countries such as South Africa, which are not represented on
the bench, may have a judge appointed. Article 83 of the Rules of the
Court provides:
If the advisory opinion is requested upon a legal question actually pending
between two or more States, Article 31 of the Statute shall apply, as also
the provisions of these Rules concerning the application of that Article.
Article 31 of the Statute entitles a party, as a matter of right, to
choose a person to sit as a judge when no judge of the party's
nationality is included upon the bench. While it is clear that the 1971
advisory opinion was requested upon a legal question,"' rule 83
applies and the right to select a judge ad hoc exists only if the legal
question is "actually pending between two or more States." The
Court, however, was reluctant to conclude that the legal question
before it was actually pending between two states because that
determination could well have had a bearing on South Africa's
argument that the matter was a "dispute" within the meaning of
article 32 of the Charter, which requires a member of the United
Nations that is not on the Security Council to be invited to participate
on a non-voting basis in that body's discussions of any dispute to
which it is a party. Since South Africa was not invited and did not
participate in any Council discussions relating to Namibia, then, even if
the question were a "dispute," some doubt might be cast on the
validity of the Security Council's action.
While rule 83 deals only with the right to appoint judges ad hoc,
article 68 of the Statute gives the Court discretion to be guided in
advisory proceedings by the contentious proceeding provisions of the
Court's statutes "to the extent to which it recognizes them to be
51. The Court may give advisory opinions only on "legal" issues. I.C.J.
STATUTE

art. 65, para. 1.
Winter, 1971
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applicable." Rule 82, however, seems to add a caveat similar to that of
rule 83. It states that the Court, in applying any contentious
proceeding provisions to advisory proceedings, is "above all" to
consider "whether the request.., relates to a legal question actually
pending between two or more states." On the basis of this apparent
flexibility, several judges argued in the advisory opinion that the Court
could have granted South Africa's request not as a matter of right
pursuant to rule 83, but as a matter of the Court's discretion under
article 68 of the Statute and rule 82. Even assuming that the question
does not relate to a "legal question actually pending," they argued
that rule 82 would still leave room for the exercise of discretion. The
legal pendancy test should be considered "above all"-but it is not
determinative.
The Court declined to exercise this discretion, apparently on the
grounds that the Rules of the Court did not permit it to do so. It
concluded that only under rule 83 could a judge ad hoc be appointed.
Since the legal question on which its opinion was requested was not
actually pending between the states, rule 83 was, therefore, inapplicable. But, as the dissent pointed out, rule 83 deals only with the
situation in which a judge ad hoc, if requested, must be appointed.
Article 68 of the Court's Statute gives the Court a measure of
flexibility in making such an appointment under other circumstances.
Of equal significance for purposes of this discussion, Judge Dillard
in his concurrence properly underscored the importance of the
selection of a judge ad hoc to the reception of the opinion and to the
Court's image of fairness:
Since the interests of South Africa were so critically involved the
appointment of a judge ad hoc would have assured the Court that those
interests would have been viewed through the perspective of one thoroughly
familiar with them. Furthermore should the Opinion of the Court have been
unfavorable to the interests of South Africa the presence on the Court of a
judge ad hoc, even in a dissenting capacity, would have added rather than
detracted from the probative value of the Opinion. Whatever may be
thought in general about the institution of a judge ad hoc, as to which
opinions vary, it seemed to me that one of its justifications, namely that it is
important not only that justice be done but that it appears to have been
done, would have justified the use of the Court's discretionary power
without attracting the theoretical and practical difficulties invited by
to a larger extent into one comparable to a
assimilating the 5proceeding
2
contentious case.
South Africa's request for a judge ad hoc was the first time such a
request had been advanced in an advisory proceeding.5 3 Ironically, its
52. [1971] I.C.J. 16,153.
Vol. 5-No. 1

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

failure to request an appointment in previous appearances before the
Court was relied upon, along with the inapplicability of rule 83, as an
additional reason for denying South Africa's request in the present
proceeding.
The Court's disposal of this question on such technical grounds
contrasts sharply with its handling of the three substantive issues
discussed. In those instances, with its fundamental objective of
securing the fulfillment of the sacred trust firmly in mind, the Court
looked to the equities in construing the documents before it. It seems
unfortunate that the Court did not take the same approach on the
procedural issues since a more consistent analysis would have
enhanced its credibility as a viable forum of equity.
B.

Transfer of Supervision over the Mandate
to the United Nations

While South Africa argued the contrary, even the two dissents to
the Court's opinion accepted the position that the mandate survived
the dissolution of the League. Judge Fitzmaurice stated explicitly,
"The various Mandates comprising the League of Nations mandates
system survived the dissolution of that entity in 1946. . . ."" This is
of particular interest in view of the Court's statement in its 1966
55
opinion that it was leaving that precise question open.
The issue, however, became a part of the more important question
of whether the General Assembly was invested with the power of
supervision over the mandatory previously exercised by the Council of

the League. Moreover, the passage of supervisory functions was crucial
to any consideration of the General Assembly's power to revoke the
mandate. The 1950 opinion concluded that supervisory functions had
passed to the General Assembly. The opinions of 1955, 1956 and
1962 confirmed this conclusion. It is noteworthy, however, that the
later decisions did not treat the 1950 opinion as setting forth the law
of the case.5" In confronting the issue again in 1971, the Court felt
obliged to reaffirm its original reasoning.
53. A request for a judge ad hoc in an advisory proceeding had been submitted
to the Permanent Court of International Justice and denied. Case of Danzig
Legislative Decrees, [1935] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 65 Annex 1, at 69. The Court
in its 1971 advisory opinion seems to have relied somewhat on this case. [1971]
I.C.J. 16, 27. Judge Dillard quite rightly pointed out that the advisory procedures
were quite different at the time of the Danzig decision and thought it
distinguishable. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 153 n.1.
54. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 224.
55. [1966] I.C.J. 6, 19.
56. See, e.g., [1971] I.C.J. 16, 190. Judge de Castro stated that "the
authority of the 1950 Opinion has been firmly established." Id.
Winter, 1971
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As a preliminary matter in the present case, the Court was faced
with South Africa's contention that new facts not before the Court in
1950 justified a conclusion opposite from that reached in the earlier
opinion. South Africa called the Court's attention to the "Liang"
proposal introduced by the Chinese delegation at the final assembly of
the League of Nations and to another proposal submitted by the
Executive Committee to the United Nations Preparatory Commission. 7 Both proposals provided explicitly for the transfer of
supervisory functions over mandates from the League of Nations to
the United Nations. Since neither proposal was adopted, South Africa
argued that no transfer of supervisory functions was intended. The
Court, however, did not accept this argument. It pointed out that the
Executive Committee's proposal was rejected because it was felt that
its terms might delay negotiations over trusteeship agreements and
that the "Liang" proposal was ruled out of order and never
considered. Thus, despite Judge Fitzmaurice's challenge to this latter
observation as a matter of fact, 8 the Court eventually concluded that

the League did intend supervision to be transfered to the General
Assembly.
Having rejected South Africa's claim that new facts justified a
reversal of the 1950 opinion, the Court proceeded to rearticulate its
earlier reasoning. It is in this analysis that the differences in approach
between the Court and Judge Fitzmaurice dramatically emerged. The
Court, as it did in 1950, built its analysis on a consideration of the
nature and purpose of the mandate and the sacred trust that it
represented. Within that broad context, it analyzed the effect of the
April 18, 1946, League resolution, as well as article 80 and article 10
of the U.N. Charter. The Court did not look initially to the words of
the governing instruments, but considered them only in the context of
the fundamental objectives of the mandate. As will be noted, a literal
reading of the League's final resolution and the Charter articles does
not offer a particularly persuasive basis on which to conclude that
supervisory functions were intended to pass to the General Assembly.
As in 1950, however, that perspective was evidently ignored because
the Court stated emphatically:
It would have been contrary to the overriding purpose of the mandates
system to assume that difficulties in the way of the replacement of one
regime by another designed to improve international supervision should

57. Judge Fitzmaurice reproduced the texts of these proposals in his dissent.
[1971] I.C.J. 16, 245-46, 248.
58. Judge Fitzmaurice asserted that the reason that the proposal was not
adopted "does not appear upon the record." [1971] I.C.J. 16, 248.
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have been permitted to bring about, on the dissolution
of the League, a
5 9
complete disappearance of international supervision.
The Court mustered an additional argument under article 80,
paragraph 1. That article adds a caveat to chapter XII dealing with the

establishment of the trusteeship system. It stipulates that:
Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made
under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship
system and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this
Chapter [XII] shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing
international instruments
to which members of the United Nations may
60
respectively be parties.
The Court stressed the words "rights... of... any peoples" and
agreed with the 1950 opinion, which stated that the obvious intention

of article 80 was "....

to safeguard the rights of States and peoples

under all circumstances and in all respects, until each territory should

be placed under the Trusteeship System.", 6 1 Judge Fitzmaurice, on
the other hand, stressed the fact that the language of this article was
limited to the effects that chapter XII would have on existing rights
and the terms of existing agreements. Despite these textually sound

arguments to the contrary, the Court gave article 80 the broad reading
necessary for the Court to achieve its fundamental purpose of
preserving the rights of the Namibian people.
South Africa argued further that even if supervision had passed to
the U.N., article 80 could not be read as transferring the duty to
report under the mandate itself. The Court rejected this contention by

reading article 80 together with article 10, which authorizes the
General Assembly to discuss any question or make recommendations
on any matter within the scope of the Charter. 62 The Court reasoned

59. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 33. In commenting on the 1950 opinion, Sir Hersh
Lauterpacht noted that the Court essentially applied the cy pres doctrine to an
international situation. In rendering effective a general charitable intention in
spite of apparent legal obstacles to its fulfillment, the Court acted as a classic

court of equity. H.

LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-

279 (1958).
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 80, para. 1.
61. [1950] I.C.J. 128, 134 (emphasis added).
62. "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within
the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any
organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12,
may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the
Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters." U.N. CHARTER
art. 10.
TIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
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that since article 80 preserved the obligations of the mandatory and
the United Nations was the appropriate supervisory forum,
by virtue of Article 10 of the Charter, South Africa agreed to submit its
administration of South West Africa to the scrutiny of the General
Assembly on the basis of the information furnished by the Mandatory or
obtained from other sources. The transfer of the obligation to report, from
the League Council to the General Assembly
was merely a corollary of the
63
powers granted to the General Assembly.
Although not stressed, article 6 of the mandate provides additional
support for this proposition. That article required South Africa to
report annually "to the satisfaction of the Council" on measures being
taken to carry out its obligations. Since the report had to be approved,
it seems clear that the Council was intended to exercise supervision.
Thus, if supervision had passed to the U.N., the text of the mandate
itself established the responsibility of South Africa to report and the
obligation of the General Assembly to scrutinize such reports in light
of the fundamental principles underlying the mandate. But the Court
did not choose to follow that rationale. Instead, it reaffirmed the line
of reasoning first adopted in 1950 and founded on the U.N. Charter.
The Court's response was simply a restatement of its position that,
without supervision, the mandate's administration would be disguised
annexation and that supervision was a corollary to the reporting
obligation required by article 10.
Judge Fitzmaurice, however, disagreed with the Court's broad
reading of article 10.64 He argued that not only are mandates without
the "scope of the present Charter," but also that the power to discuss
and make recommendations simply cannot be read to vest the General
Assembly with supervisory functions. Even more fundamentally, he
argued that such general language could not oblige the mandatories to
accept General Assembly supervision. In this regard, Judge Fitzmaurice reiterated South Africa's argument that the duty to report did
not mean the obligation to accept supervision. His argument proceeds
from an initial analysis of the League's intentions at the time it
dissolved. He stated that even if the resolution of April 18, 1946, is
read to mean that the mandate survived the League's dissolution, it
still would not support the conclusion that the mandatories had
become accountable to the U.N. as mandatories. He argued that the
reference in the resolution to chapter XI might at best be taken as an
understanding that mandatories would supply technical reports "for
information purposes" as provided under article 73 of that chapter.

63. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 37.
64. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 236-37.
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He also urged that a more realistic analysis would conclude that the
reporting obligation, if it did survive the League, became dormant
because there was no international body to which the reports could be
submitted. Indeed, he hypothesized that the mandatories themselves
could have set up some vehicle for making information regarding their
administration available to the public. Judge Fitzmaurice made a
number of other arguments to show that supervisory functions were
not transferred to the General Assembly. In one of them, he referred
to an early General Assembly resolution 6s dealing with the limited
functions that the General Assembly undertook to assume from the
League. He also examined the statements of South African authorities
immediately after World War II and concluded that while they might
be taken as acknowledging the existence of the mandate, they do not
constitute consent to U.N. supervision. All of these factors led Judge
Fitzmaurice to a conclusion fundamentally at odds with the objectives
of the Court's majority. He rejected the Court's position that the
reporting obligation is a function of the supervision of the mandatory
by the international community-which, in turn, is security for the
performance of the sacred trust. The differences in approach proceed
ultimately from the degree of importance attached to achieving the
execution of that trust.
C.

The Validity of the Termination of the Mandate

The initial question presented to the Court concerned the legal
consequences for states of South Africa's continued presence in
Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276. That
resolution assumed that the mandate had been validly terminated and
declared all acts taken by South Africa thereafter to be illegal. 66 If,
however, that assumption was itself unwarranted, then the basis for
declaring South Africa's actions illegal and invalid after that resolution
65. General Assembly resolution 14 of February 12, 1946, states in part:
"3. The General Assembly declares that the United Nations is willing in
principle, and subject to the provisions of this resolution and of the Charter of the
United Nations, to assume the exercise of certain functions and powers previously
entrusted to the League of Nations and adopts the following decisions set forth in
A, B and C below.... C. Functions and Powers under Treaties, International
Conventions, Agreements and other Instruments Having a Political Character. The
General Assembly will itself examine, or will submit to the appropriate organ of
the United Nations, any request from the parties that the United Nations should
assume the exercise of functions or powers entrusted to the League of Nations by
treaties, international conventions, agreements and other instruments having a
political character."
66. See text pp. 221-22 supra.
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would have been removed. Consequently, the Court had to consider
the validity of the termination before it could proceed to analyze the
effect of resolution 276.67 The Court's opinion, however, does not
indicate clearly whether it was accepting the findings of the General
Assembly in justifying termination6 8 or whether it was independently
reviewing and then agreeing with them. The result is the same, but the
matter is of significance in an examination of I.C.J. jurisprudence.
As the first step in its analysis, the Court had to determine whether
the League, as the General Assembly's predecessor, had the power to
terminate a mandate. The conclusion that the League's supervisory
powers had passed to the United Nations did not reach this
fundamental question, for even if the United Nations could supervise,
it could not exercise any powers exceeding those of the League.6 9
The Court picked up the basic line of reasoning employed by some of
the delegates during the General Assembly debates. While the
Covenant's silence regarding revocation could be taken as an indication that the power did not exist, the Court argued that such a
conclusion would overlook "the general principle of law that a right of
termination on account of breach must be presumed to exist in
respect of all treaties." 70
Once again Judge Fitzmaurice locked horns with the majority. He

presented a tight argument based upon a close reading of the
governing instruments and on an analysis of the mandate system as
conceived by its founders. Initially, he pointed out that none of the
League instruments mentioned revocation and argued that for such a
significant power to exist, it would have to have been specifically
conferred. Secondly, with regard to the Court's assertion of a right of
termination under treaty law, Judge Fitzmaurice attacked the Court's
inconsistency:
If, on the basis of contractual principles, fundamental breaches justify
unilateral revocation, then equally is it the case that contractual principles
require that a new party to a contract cannot be imposed on an existing one
without the latter's consent (novation). Since in the present case one of the
alleged fundamental breaches is precisely the evident non-acceptance of this
new party, and of any duty of accountability to it (such an acceptance
being ex hypothesi, on contractual principles, not obligatory), a total
inconsistency is revealed as lying at the71root of the whole opinion of the
Court in one of its most essential aspects.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See [1971] I.C.J. 16, 130-31 (Petren, J. concurring).
See text p. 220 supra.
[1950]- pJ.128, 138.
[1971] I.C.J. 16,47.
[1971] I.C.J. 16, 267.
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The application of treaty principles is acceptable in this context, he
argued, only if those principles had likewise been applied in
considering whether supervision had passed to the United Nations.
This is a facile argument, but it is persuasive only in the legalistic
context in which it is made.
The Court did not even discuss the dissent's point in its opinion. As
in its discussion of U.N. supervision, the Court's primary objectives
were to secure the rights of the people of Namibia and to fulfill the
purposes of the sacred trust.7 2 In concluding that supervision had
been transferred, the Court looked essentially at the institutional
aspects of the mandate. In considering the question of revocation,
however, it took another tack that may not have been consistent in
Judge Fitzmaurice's eyes, but that was calculated to achieve the
Court's consistent objectives. It looked beyond the institutional
aspects of the mandate to its treaty features:
[E] ven if the mandate is viewed as having the character of an institution, as
is maintained, it depends on those international
agreements which created
73
the system and regulated its application.

Having applied the law of treaties to the general question of
whether a right to revoke the mandate existed, the Court still faced
the specific consideration of the League's power to revoke under its
own Covenant. Article 4, paragraph 5 and article 5, paragraph 1, of
the Covenant 74 were read together historically to require unanimous
voting for Council decisions on all but certain specified matters, which
did not include mandate questions. 7
But had unaniminity been
required to revoke the mandate, then the League's power to revoke
would have rested upon South Africa's consent. The Court brushed
this line of reasoning aside:
... revocation could only result from a situation in which the Mandatory
had committed a serious breach of the obligations it had undertaken. To
72. See, e.g., note 59 supra.
73. [1971] I.C.J. 16,46.
74. "Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be
invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council
during the consideration of matters specifically affecting the interests of that
Member of the League." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 4, para. 5.
"Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant... decisions at
any meeting of the... Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of
the League represented at the meeting." LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT
art. 5, para. 1.
75. This was the unanimity under discussion in a different context in the 1955
opinion. There the question was whether the United Nations could vote with its
two-thirds majority rule on mandate matters. It could, the Court opined, as a
matter of procedure.
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contend, on the basis of the principle of unanimity which applied in the
League of Nations, that in this case revocation could only take place with
the concurrence of the Mandatory, would not only run contrary to the
general principle of law governing termination on account of breach, but
also postulate an impossibility. For obvious reasons, the consent of the
76
wrongdoer to such a form of termination cannot be required.
While the Court was able to conclude with relative ease that the
League had the power to revoke the mandate, the next question of
whether the exercise of that power by the United Nations was
warranted under the circumstances caused it some difficulty. The
problem came not so much in answering the question, but rather in
determining which organ of the United Nations was competent to
provide an answer. The Court thus faced the recurring question of
whether it could review the determinations made by the General
Assembly. At best, its answer was confused." The Court directed the
discussion not in terms of its right to review, but as a response to the
objection that the General Assembly had made pronouncements
that it had no competence to make because it was not a judicial
organ. The Court's defensive response virtually disregards the question
implicit in this objection regarding the role of the Court in reviewing
the General Assembly's findings:
To deny to a political organ of the United Nations which is a successor of
the League in this respect the right to act, on the argument that it lacks
competence to render what is described as a judicial decision, would not
only be inconsistent but would amount to a complete denial of the remedies
available against fundamental breaches of an international undertaking.
The Court is unable to appreciate the view that the General Assembly
acted unilaterially as party and judge in its own cause. In the 1966
Judgement in the South West Africa cases, referred to above, it was found
that the function to call for the due execution of the relevant provisions of
the mandate instruments appertained to the League acting as an entity
through its appropriate organs. The right of the League in the pursuit of its

76. [1971] I.C.J. 16,49.
77. As a preliminary matter, the opinion examined the wording of the
resolution and the principles of international law regulating the termination of a
treaty on account of breach. It referred specifically to the provisions of the
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Its discussion concludes by stating that
resolution 2145 "is therefore to be viewed as the exercise of the right to terminate
a relationship in case of a deliberate and persistent violation of obligations which
destroys the very object and purpose of that relationship." [1971] I.C.J. 16, 40.
Then, having decided that the international law of treaties was applicable to its

analysis, the Court regresses into an equivocal discussion concerning which organ
of the United Nations is competent to determine that such severe violations have
occurred.
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collective, institutional activity, to require the due performance of the
Mandate in discharge of the "sacred trust," was specifically recognized.
Having regard to this finding, the United Nations as a successor to the
League acting through its competent organs, must be seen above all as the
supervisory institution, competent to pronounce in that capacity, on the
conduct of the mandatory with
respect to its international obligations, and
78
competent to act accordingly.
In the first part of this pronouncement, the Court asserts the right of
the political organ of the United Nations to act in the face of a breach.
In the last sentence, however, it equivocally refers to those organs as
"competent to pronounce."
The Court is, of course, an organ of the United Nations79 and an
appropriate final arbiter of whether there had been a material breach
justifying termination under principles of international law. But
confusion as to whether it acted in that capacity is compounded in the
next paragraph of the opinion. The Court turned to South Africa's
argument that paragraph three of General Assembly's resolution
2145-the declaration of South Africa's failure to fulfill its mandate
obligations-called for the development of further facts before the
General Assembly could adopt the resolution or the Court could pass
on its validity. The Court answered:
The failure of South Africa to comply with the obligation to submit to
supervision and to render reports, an essential part of the Mandate, cannot
be disputed in the light of determinations made by this Court on more
occasions than one. In relying on these, as on other findings of the Court in
previous proceedings
concerning South West Africa, the Court adheres to its
80
own jurisprudence.
The failure to submit reports is one of the principle grounds for a

claim of material breach. The Court, therefore, seems to be making an
independent finding on a fundamental question. Since this was done
in the context of denying South Africa the opportunity to present
more facts, however, the matter is far from clear.
The Court's handling of the question of apartheid is even more
puzzling. In the contentious proceedings, the Applicants claimed that
the imposition of apartheid was a per se violation of the mandate"'
and that there was no reason to look at the intent or effect of the laws
reflecting that policy. In this proceeding, South Africa again maintained that further inquiry was necessary before the Court could
properly determine whether that policy constituted a material
78.
79.
80.
81.

[1971] I.C.J. 16, 49-50 (emphasis added).
U.N. CHARTER art. 92, para. 1.
[1971] I.C.J. 16, 50 (emphasis added).
See Mandate, art. 2.
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violation of the mandate. The Court's opinion does not mention the
subject of apartheid, except in dealing with this specific South African
request. Its discussion on the point follows the Court's ruling on the
legal consequences to states of South Africa's continued Namibian
presence in spite of resolution 276, which is the heart of the question
presented. Nonetheless, despite their different locations in the
opinion, the Court's comment concerning apartheid should be
considered along with the comment on South Africa's failure to
render reports because both were advanced only in response to a
request for the chance to submit further factual information. The
Court, in concluding that no further evidence was needed to
determine "whether the policy of apartheid as applied by South
Africa in Namibia is in conformity with the international obligations
assumed by South Africa under the Charter," 8 2 stated that:
... the former Mandatory had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a
territory having an international status, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race. To establish instead, and to
enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively
based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which
constitute a denial of fundamental human
rights is a flagrant violation of the
83
purposes and principles of the Charter.
It is debatable whether the Court, in this portion of its opinion, was
simply rejecting South Africa's bid to submit further evidence or
whether it was articulating an independent, fundamental basis for its
opinion. Judge Dillard felt sufficiently troubled by this language to
comment that the Court did not purport to validate the termination
of the mandate on the basis of South Africa's imposition of apartheid.

He stated that it "would not have been compatible with its judicial
function to have determined the issue of breach of these grounds in
the absence of a full disclosure of all relevant facts., 84 He felt that
the opinion justified revocation on the basis of South Africa's failure
to accept supervision and submit reports.8" Although this analysis
may have been satisfactory to Judge Dillard, it should be reiterated
that the Court's comment on South Africa's failure to submit to
supervision was also made solely as a response to a request for the
chance to submit further factual information. Therefore, even if Judge
Dillard's analysis is accepted, the Court's language, coupled with its

82.
83.
84.
85.
in full,

[1971] I.C.J. 16,57.
[1971] I.C.J. 16,57.
[1971] I.C.J. 16,138.
[1971] I.C.J. 16, 138. The language to which he referred is quoted, nearly
at text accompanying note 80 supra.
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earlier equivocal remarks, still leaves in doubt the validity of the
analytical process through which it reached its decision.
The Court acted much more definitively in handling the final
challenge to the General Assembly's authority to terminate the
mandate. The French, in their written statement,86 and the South
Africans, in both their presentations, argued that the General
Assembly acted ultra vires in adopting resolution 2145. The Court
stated:
[The I.C.J.] undoubtedly does not possess powers of judicial review or
appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs
concerned. The question of the validity or conformity with the Charter of
General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security Council
8

resolutions does not form the subject of the request for advisory opinion. 7
In its next sentence, however, the Court stated that since they had
been advanced, it would "in the course of its reasoning. .. consider
these objections before determining any legal consequences arising
88
from those resolutions.
Judge Fitzmaurice articulated the objections with great clarity. He
reviewed the powers of the General Assembly under the Charter and
concluded that the "Assembly is either limited to making recommendations or, where it can do more, it is as a result of specific power
conferred by the express terms of some provision of the Charter."8 9
Since the Assembly does not have the specific authority to take the
executive action reflected in the resolution, he argued that resolution
2145 was outside the General Assembly's competence.
The Court, however, continued to be reluctant to be drawn into a
discussion of the General Assembly's competence. It made only one

passing comment implying the existence of an inherent Assembly
power to act in specific cases within its Charter-granted authority.9"
It is not clear why the Court took this cautious approach, particularly
when it could easily have concluded on the basis of its earlier
reasoning that the General Assembly had power to act in the exercise
of its unique supervisory authority. Whatever the reasons for this
approach, the basic conclusions were unchanged. The Court was able
to decide in the face of a number of compelling legal arguments that
the mandate had been validly terminated.

86. Member states are invited to submit written statements to the Court
within a specified time after a request for an advisory opinion is received.
87.
88.
89.
90.

[1971]
[19711
[1971]
[1971]

I.C.J. 16,45.
I.C.J. 16, 45.
I.C.J. 16, 280 n.62.
I.C.J. 16, 50.
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D. Security Council Resolution 276
As the prelude to its discussion of the legal consequences to states
of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia, the Court concluded
that resolution 276 was binding on states who were members of the
United Nations. To reach this conclusion, the Court indulged in a very
broad reading of the Charter which not only concerned Judge
Fitzmaurice, but also forced Judge Dillard to comment that the
conclusion reached was applicable only to the unique Namibian
situation.
In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed the various Security
Council resolutions in order to determine the context in which they
were passed. Relying on the text of the resolutions, as well as on the
background surrounding their adoption, the Court concluded that
when the Council adopted the resolutions, it "was acting in the
exercise of what it deemed to be its primary responsibility, the
maintenance of peace and security which, under the Charter, embraces
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." 9 1
Having established this point, the Court directed its discussion to
article 24 of the Charter through which United Nations members
confer on the Security Council the primary responsibility for "the
maintenance of international peace and security." That article reflects
a consensus that in "carrying out its duties under this responsibility,"
the Security Council acts on the member's behalf. Paragraph (2) of
article 24 further provides that:
In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid
down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII. 92
The Court concluded that while this paragraph authorized the exercise
of certain specific powers, it did not preclude the existence of other
general powers that the Council might exercise in undertaking its
peacekeeping responsibilities. Of equal significance, the Court held
that if the Security Council decided to exercise that power, its
decisions would be binding on member states by virtue of article

25 .93

Again, Judge Fitzmaurice's dissent meets the issue head on. In the
first instance, he did not accept the broad reading that the Court gave
to article 24. That article, he argued, limits the type of action that the
91. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 51-52.
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2 (emphasis added). The words "these
duties" appear to relate to the duties specified in article 24, paragraph 1.
93. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 53.
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Council can take in the discharge of its peacekeeping responsibilities.
To the extent that the power to bind members is given to the Council
in its peacekeeping functions, it is conferred not by the interaction of
articles 24 and 25, but rather by the particular chapters invoked. His
discussion of article 25 articulated this position and illustrated his
judicial technique:
If, under the relevant chapter or article of the Charter, the decision is not
binding, Article 25 cannot make it so. If the effect of that Article were
automatically to make all decisions of the Security Council binding, then
the words 'in accordance with the present Charter, would be quite
superfluous. They would add nothing to the preceding and only other
phrase in the Article, namely 'the Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, which they are
clearly intended to qualify. They effectively do so only if the decisions
referred to are those which are duly binding 'in accordance with the present
Charter.' Otherwise the language used in such parts of the Charter as
Chapter VI for instance, indicative of recommendatory functions only,
would 4 be in direct contradiction with Article 25-or Article 25 with
them.

The potential significance of the Court's position is emphasized in a
further comment. Judge Fitzmaurice urged that limitations on
Security Council powers are necessary because of the "all too great
ease with which any acutely controversial international situation can
be represented as involving a latent threat to peace and security, even
where it is really too remote genuinely to constitute one.""5
In his discussion of this point, Judge Dillard emphasized the
uniqueness of the Namibian situation. By invoking articles 24 and 25
of the Charter, he maintained that the Court was not implying that
the United Nations had broad powers of a quasi-legislative nature. 6
Despite Judge DiUllard's caveat, the Court's language, as previously
noted, is not qualified and did not rest upon the singular nature of the
Namibian situation. In fact, the Court's analysis of articles 24 and 25
was in the context of establishing whether a general power to bind
existed. The Court spoke in general terms of the applicable principles:
The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully
analyzed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of
the nature of the powers under Article 25, the questions whether they have
been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the
terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the
Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might

94. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 293.
95. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 294.
96. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 138.
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assist in determining
the legal consequences of the resolution of the Security
97
Council.

The Court then proceeded to apply these "tests" 9 8 to resolution 276
in order to determine whether the Security Council intended to
exercise its power in that instance. It concluded that the decisions set
forth in paragraphs two and five of that resolution9 9 were adopted in
conformity with the principles of the Charter and articles 24 and 25,
and that they were consequently "binding on all States members of
the United Nations, which are thus under obligation to accept and
carry them out."1 0
This conclusion enabled the Court to define the legal consequences
to states in much broader terms than would otherwise have been
possible. Had the Court found that resolution 276 was merely
recommendatory, the legal consequences to states would have
proceeded solely from the termination of the mandate and its
reaffirmation by the Security Council. While states technically would
have been obliged not to recognize South Africa's administration of
Namibia, such a policy of non-recognition has limited boundaries. As
Judge Petren observed, under today's international law "non-recognition has obligatory negative effects in only a very limited sector of

governmental acts of a somewhat symbolic nature." ' '

By concluding

that Security Council resolution 276 was binding, the Court not only
required member states not to recognize South Africa's administration, but also imposed an affirmative obligation to apply pressure in
order to force South Africa out of Namibia." 2 As an example of the
zeal with which the Court pursued its goal, its treatment of this issue
is one of the most positive in the advisory opinion. As an exercise in
judicial ground-breaking, it may have great significance for the future
operations of the Security Council. More important, however, the
reaction of member states to its reasoning on this issue will be

97. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 53.
98. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 53.
99. See text p. 222 supra.
100. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 53.
101. [1971] I.C.J. 16, 122.
102. See [1971] I.C.J. 16, 136-37 (Petren, J. concurring); [1971] I.C.J. 16,
165-67 (Dillard, J. concurring). It is interesting that the Court drew the line in
refusing to comment on Security Council resolution 283. That resolution spelled
out in detail positive steps which member states were to take in applying pressure
on South Africa. While an argument could be made that a consideration of that
resolution was as relevant to the question as a consideration of the basic General
Assembly resolution, the Court's reluctance to address that question is understandable.
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interesting not only because of the effect that acceptance of this
reasoning could have on the Namibian situation, but also because of
the effect that its rejection might have on the Court's future.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The questions raised by the Court's opinion concerning resolution
276 are reflected in the opinion as a whole. While showing a
reluctance to review certain determinations by the General Assembly,
the Court showed a great liberality in developing its general
construction of the Charter and the Covenant. It similarly gave a
broad interpretation to the Security Council's resolutions, providing
them with far-reaching effects. Thus, the Court's rearticulation in
1971 of the consistently broad approach previously utilized since
1950 may emphasize the futility of resorting to that institution if
South Africa continues to ignore its conclusions. The language
employed and the conclusions reached are, by themselves, of little
comfort.
Of course, much depends on the acceptance by member states of
the Court's conclusion that Security Council resolution 276 is binding.
If a number of states agree not only to refuse recognition of South
Africa's Namibian administration, but also take positive action to end
it, then any forthcoming concessions from South Africa will tend to
enhance the position of the Court. On the other hand, rejection of the
Court's conclusions regarding resolution 276 will result in continued
South African presence in Namibia as a conspicuous example of the
Court's ineffectiveness. Even apart from its consequences, the rejection by member states, in itself, will be damaging to the Court's
prestige. As a final response to such a possibility, on October 20,
1971, the Security Council adopted resolution 301, which reiterated
the Council's opposition to South Africa's presence in Namibia and
10 3
expressed agreement with the Court's 1971 advisory opinion.
Significantly, no member of the Security Council voted against
resolution 301. Although France and the United Kingdom abstained,
thirteen members voted in the affirmative. This favorable vote, when
considered together with the language of the resolution, seems to
indicate that the Council was clearly relying on the advisory opinion
in seeking to resolve the Namibian situation. In so doing, the Council

103. Security Council Resolution 301, paras. 4 & 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/301
(1971).
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declared that any further refusal of South Africa to withdraw "could
create conditions detrimental to the maintenance of peace and
security in the region .... ",104 Having established an apparent legal
foundation that would render subsequent provisions binding on
member states pursuant to the advisory opinion of 1971,10 s the

resolution sets forth its charges to those states in reference to
Namibia:
(a) it reaffirms the provisions of resolution 283;106
(b) it "calls upon" all states, subject to the provisions of paragraphs
122107 and 125'08 of the advisory opinion, to undertake a number of
specific actions, including abstention from treaty and economic relations
with South Africa that
would recognize or entrench South Africa's
10 9
authority over Namibia;
(c) it declares that franchises, rights, titles or contracts relating to
Namibia granted by South Africa after General Assembly resolution 2145
"are not subject to protection or espousal by their states against claims of a
future lawful Government of Namibia."'"O

104. Id. para. 9 (emphasis added).
105. See pp. 237-40 supra.
106. Security Council Resolution 301, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/301
(1971). For a discussion of resolution 283, see p. 222 supra.
107. "122. For the reasons given above, and subject to the observations
contained in paragraph 125 below, member states are under obligation to abstain
from entering into treaty relations with South Africa in all cases in which the
Government of South Africa purports to act on behalf of or concerning Namibia
which involve active inter-governmental co-operation. With respect to multilateral
treaties, however, the same rule cannot be applied to certain general conventions
such as those of a humanitarian character, the non-performance of which may
adversely affect the people of Namibia. It will be for the competent international
organs to take specific measures in this respect." [1971] I.C.J. 16, 55.
108. "125. In general, the non-recognition of South Africa's administration
of the Territory should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any
advantages derived from international co-operation. In particular, while official
acts performed by the Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning
Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity
cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births,

deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of
the inhabitants of the Territory." [1971] I.C.J. 16, 56.
109. Security Council Resolution 301, para. 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/301
(1971).
110. Security Council Resolution 301, para. 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/301
(1971).
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The I.C.J.'s 1971 opinion seems to have precipitated more forceful
action by the Security Council based on the legal validity of the
Council's power to act. Consequently, Namibia's future would appear,
in the short run at least, to be tied more closely than ever to the
future of the Court.
Even if the member states accept the opinion and take action
consistent with the Security Council's resolution, however, the
outlook for the Court may still be cloudy. While progress in resolving
the Namibian situation based on acceptance of the 1971 advisory
opinion will enhance the Court's stature to some extent, the more
fundamental problems afflicting the Court remain. For example, there
can be no assurance that member states will utilize the Court as a
forum for settling disputes, despite the passage of General Assembly
resolution 2723. That resolution represented little more than a
recognition that the judicial organ of the United Nations is withering
on the vine. In the long run, the Court's future will depend on its
ability first, to revise its procedures to encourage the swift, flexible
and fair handling of difficult questions on the marits; and second, to
convince the international community that disputes not only can, but
should, be settled by the Court.
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